





















This paper presents a comprehensive overview of existing methods of mitigating 
double taxation of corporate income within a standard cost of capital model. Two 
of the most well-known and most utilized methods, the imputation and the split rate 
systems, do not mitigate double taxation in corporations where the marginal 
investment is financed with retained earnings. However, all methods are effective 
when the marginal investment is financed with new share issues. The corporate tax 
rate, fiscal allowances, allocation to periodization funds and allocation to tax 
equalization reserves (or allowance for corporate equity) are effective instruments, 
independent of the sources of financing. The paper also discusses why so many 
different methods have been employed in mitigating double taxation. 
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1 Introduction 
The expression double taxation refers to a situation where the income of a corporation is 
taxed more than once. It is first taxed at the corporate level when arising and then at the 
shareholder level when distributed. A large number of methods have been used for integrating 
the two levels of taxation, which may be divided into two different categories. The trivial 
methods are those making use of reduced tax rates or increased allowance rates within an 
existing tax structure. The genuine methods are based on a specific arrangement that reduces 
the amount of tax paid at the corporate or shareholder level. The imputation system at the 
shareholder level and the split rate system at the corporate level are the most well-known 
methods in this second category. 
 
Most of the countries in the EU integrate the two levels of taxation. A full or partial 
imputation system is found in Finland, France, Italy and the United Kingdom. A couple of 
countries use a special personal tax rate on dividends; a flat rate in Austria, Belgium and 
Denmark, and zero in Greece for examples. Sweden uses a method based on a tax-free 
allocation of a proportion of the corporate income, while only half of the corporate income is 
taxed at the personal level in Germany. The Netherlands still keeps the classical system of 
corporate taxation, where corporate and personal taxes are not integrated. Outside the EU, the 
U.S. also keeps the classical system, while Norway has an imputation system. 
 
The corporate and personal taxes insert a wedge between the pre-tax rate of return on 
investment and the shareholders’ post-tax return. Hence, double taxation of corporate income 
may result in a higher cost of capital, i.e. the financing cost of the last investment undertaken. 
The different methods proposed for tax integration are intended to reduce the cost of capital. 
The discussion of different schemes for reducing double taxation is therefore essentially a 
discussion of investment incentives, which is also the approach taken in this paper.  
 
Schemes aiming at reducing double taxation take many different forms, but they all reduce the 
effective tax burden on corporate earnings. In this paper, a number of methods are analyzed in 
one and the same model, with the ultimate purpose of comparing effective tax rates. We 
calculate the King-Fullerton effective tax rates, i.e. the tax wedges expressed as a percentage 
of pre-tax returns.
1 As is standard in the literature, the corporation is assumed to maximize the 
                                                 
1 King and Fullerton (1984).  2
present value of its future net cash flow to the shareholders, subject to various financial 
constraints and specific constraints connected with the tax integration schemes. Since all 
schemes are analyzed within the same model, the results are comparable, and differences and 
similarities are clearly illustrated. Many of the methods have been modeled and discussed 
separately in various contexts over the years, but the contribution of this paper is a 
comprehensive overview and comparison of existing schemes. 
 
Over the past decades, capital has become increasingly internationally mobile, for instance 
implying that both domestic and foreign investors may be the owners of corporate equity. We 
assume, however, that the marginal shareholder is a domestic investor in this paper. There are 
two sources of investment funds, retained earnings and new share issues, and the possible 
uses of the return of the marginal investment are reinvestment and dividend distribution. The 
corporation may find itself in one of two regimes, the retention regime, where the marginal 
investment is financed with retained earnings and the new share issue regime, where the 
marginal investment is financed with newly issued equity.
2  
 
Following this introduction, section 2 contains a comprehensive derivation of a general 
neoclassical model of firm behavior, which will serve as a benchmark in evaluating the 
different tax integration schemes. In section 3, we derive the cost of capital for the different 
schemes under the retention and new share issue regimes. A comparison of the methods is 
found in section 4. Besides an analytical comparison, clarified through numerical simulations, 
the King-Fullerton effective tax rate is calculated, allowing a straightforward comparison of 
the methods. Section 5 summarizes and also adds some other perspectives on the different tax 
integration schemes. 
 
2 The general model 
2.1 The value of the corporation 
We will set up a general neoclassical model of firm behavior where the cost of capital is 
derived under the classical system of corporate taxation. With this system, corporate income 
is fully taxed at both the corporate and the shareholder level, i.e. no method is employed for 
integrating the two levels of taxation. The expressions derived for the cost of capital in the 
                                                 
2 The regimes correspond to the new and the traditional view of dividend taxation, respectively.   3
classical system are standard in the corporate taxation literature. The classical system will 
serve as a benchmark for the subsequent analysis of the different tax integration schemes.
3 
 
A capital market in equilibrium is characterized by the marginal investor being indifferent 
between an investment in shares or bonds, which is represented by the following non-
arbitrage condition 
 
  () () () () 00 0 1( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) pi pd pc iV t D t V N t τττ −= − + − − ! .   (1) 
 
0 () Vt  is the market value of the corporation at time  0 t , i  is the market interest rate on bonds 
and  pi τ  is the personal tax rate on interest income, which means that the term on the left-hand 
side equals the investor’s after-tax return of holding the amount  0 () Vt  in bonds.  0 () D t  is the 
dividend and  pd τ  is the personal tax rate on dividend, so that () 0 1( ) pd D t τ −  is the after-tax 
dividend the investor receives at time  0 t . The capital gain from holding shares is given by V ! , 
i.e. the change in market value over time, and  pc τ  is the tax rate on the capital gain. The net 
capital gain after tax is given by subtracting  0 () N t , the value of new share issues at time  0 t , 
from V !  and multiplying by () 1 pc τ − . Hence, the terms on the right-hand side equal the 
investor’s return from holding shares.













=− ∫ ,       (2) 
 
                                                 
3 See Bergström and Södersten (1981) for the set-up of the problem and Sinn (1987) for technical aspects of the 
optimization problem. 
4 In the non-arbitrage condition (1), there are three different personal tax rates,  pi τ  on capital income,  pc τ  on 
capital gains and  pd τ  on dividend income. The personal tax rate on capital income is only used for interest 
income and may or may not be equal to the personal tax rate on dividends. Since the marginal shareholder is 

















2.2 The corporation’s budget and financial constraints 
The budget constraint follows from the fundamental cash flow constraint, saying that cash 
inflow must equal cash outflow, i.e.  () F KN D I T +=+ + , where  () F K  is the production 
function,
6 I is gross investment and T is tax liability. To simplify the expressions, we ignore 
debt without any loss of generality. The tax liability depends on the corporation’s taxable 
income defined by  () F KC π γ ≡−, where γ  is the fiscal depreciation rate, C is the book 
value of the capital stock and hence,  C γ  equals the amount of fiscal tax depreciation. If τ  is 
defined as the general corporate tax rate, the tax liability is T τ π = . Substituting for T in the 
cash flow constraint, the corporation’s budget constraint becomes 
 
  () ( ) 1 D FK N I C τ τ γ =− +− + .       (3) 
As in Auerbach (1984) or Poterba and Summers (1985), we will assume that the corporation 
distributes dividends and must meet a minimum dividend payout ratio. It must thus issue 
more shares to fulfill the dividend payout ratio if necessary. This assumption may be 
motivated by a signaling hypothesis, i.e. the corporation uses dividends for conveying 
information to the shareholders, or by a free cash flow problem, i.e. the shareholders are 
interested in minimizing the risk of managerial spending that is not profitable for the 
corporation. The minimum dividend payout ratio f defines a dividend floor  
 
() ( ) () 1 D fF K K τδ ≥− − ,       (4)  
 
i.e. dividends may not fall below a fraction f of the after-tax actual income.
7  
 
                                                 
5 The index (gm) stands for the general model. The time index is omitted from now on. 
6 The output price is set to unity, implying that the production function represents the corporation’s gross 
earnings. The production function is assumed to exhibit a positive but diminishing marginal product, 0 K F >  and 
0 KK F < , which guarantees a maximum solution to the optimization problem. 
7 Note the difference between the taxable income for tax purposes  () F KC γ − , affecting the amount of tax paid, 
and the actual net income  () F KK δ − , affecting dividend payout.  5
The corporation has two sources of financing, retained earnings, RE, and new share issues, N.
8 
We will distinguish between two different regimes, depending on how the marginal 
investment is financed. In the first regime, dividends are greater than the floor in (4). The 
marginal investment is then financed with retained earnings, since the corporation has the 
possibility of reducing dividends and still meets the minimum payout ratio. This regime is 
denoted the retention regime. In the second regime, the dividend constraint (4) is binding, 
implying that the corporation cannot reduce dividends. As a consequence, the marginal 
investment must be financed with a new share issue. This regime is denoted the new share 
issue regime. The distinction will be further clarified when solving the model. 
 
Further, the corporation is not allowed to repurchase its own shares 
 
  0 N ≥ ,        (5) 
 
i.e. dividend payout is the only way for the corporations of distributing income. Finally, 
changes in the book capital stock and the capital stock depend on investments, and the fiscal 
and economic depreciation rates, respectively. This gives the equations of motion as 
 




  K IK δ =− ! .      (7) 
 
2.3 The cost of capital and the importance of regime 
In order not to reduce the market value of the corporation, the rate of return on new 
investments must be greater than some minimum rate. This lowest acceptable rate represents 
the corporate cost of capital and, on the optimal path, it is equated to the first derivative of the 
production function with respect to the capital stock,  () K F K . Using an Euler equation 
approach, the problem of maximizing the market value of the corporation, V, under 
constraints (3)-(7), is formalized as 
                                                 
8 This is illustrated by rewriting the budget constraint (3) as  () ( ) 1 I FK C D N R E N ττ γ =− + −+= + .  6
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Here,  D µ ,  K µ  and  C µ  are the Lagrange shadow prices of the budget constraint, the equations 
of motion for the capital stock and the book capital stock, respectively, while  D η  and  N η  are 
the Kuhn-Tucker shadow prices of the minimum constraint on dividends and the non-negative 




I :  0 DKC µµµ −++= ,     (8) 
N :   1 0 DN µη −+ + = ,     (9) 
D: 0
gm
DD θµ η −+= ,     (10) 
K :  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 0 DD K K D K fFr f µη τ µ δ η τ δ µ −− − + + − + = ! , (11) 
C:  () 0 DC C r µτ γ µ γ µ −+ + = ! .   (12) 
 
It follows from expressions (9) and (10) that the corporation cannot both issue new shares and 
pay dividends in excess of the payout ratio unless  1 D µ θ == .
10  This condition holds only 
when the personal tax rates on dividends and capital gains are equal at the margin.
11 This case 
is omitted and we instead focus on the retention regime ( D µ θ = ) and the new share issue 
                                                 
9 The first order conditions satisfy the Euler condition  () () dd
dX t dX
Λ⋅ Λ⋅  ∂
− 
∂  !  for the state variables  , X KC =  and 





=  for  ,, X IND = . 
10 With  00 N N η > ⇒ =  and  () ( ) () 10 D Df F K K τδ η >− − ⇒ = , it is required that  1 D µθ == . 
11 Poterba and Summers (1985) examine the case when, at the margin, personal taxes on capital gains and 
dividends equal zero. They call this special case the tax irrelevance view.  7
regime ( 1 D µ = ). We will assume that the corporation is in equilibrium (steady state solution), 
implying that  0 KC µµ == !! .  
 
The retention regime (RR) 
When the corporation is in the retention regime, dividends are greater than the payout ratio, 
() ( ) () 1 D fF K K τδ >− − , and the amount of new share issues is set to zero,  0 N = , 
implying that the Kuhn-Tucker shadow prices are  0 D η =  and  0 N η > , respectively. The first 
order condition for dividends, expression (10), implies that the marginal value of equity, 
Tobin’s marginal q , equals  D q µ θ ≡= . Further, from the first order condition with respect 














=+ −  −+ 
.     (13) 
 
The net cost of capital, i.e. the gross cost less the economic depreciation δ , depends on the 
shareholders’ required rate of return r, the corporate tax rate τ  and the rate of accelerated 
depreciation, γ δ − .







 in (13) is a measure, in a 
present value sense, of the fraction of the marginal investment financed by deferred tax 









is the fraction of the marginal investment financed by corporate equity. The shareholders’ 
required rate of return, r, is adjusted by () 1 τ − , thereby reflecting the fact that the 
shareholders’ required rate of return is not tax deductible at the corporate level.  
                                                 
12 See appendix B for the algebra. 
13 Accelerated depreciation, γ δ > , enables the corporation to defer corporate tax payments. This is further 
discussed in the following as a special method of mitigating double taxation.   8











 and let the fiscal depreciation rate equal 



















.     (14) 
 
Expression (14) shows the cost of capital under a pure classical system.
15 The net cost of 
capital depends on the after-tax return on the alternative investment () 1 pi i τ − , the corporate 
tax rate τ  and the personal tax rate on capital gains  pc τ . Note that the personal tax rate on 
dividends  pd τ  does not affect the cost of capital, although dividend payout is the only way for 
the corporation of distributing income. This well-known result is the essence of the new view 
of dividend taxation.
16 The result in (14) plays a crucial role when evaluating tax integration 
schemes. We show below that schemes reducing the effective tax burden on distributed 
income - a reduced personal dividend tax rate or the imputation system for instance - do not 
affect the cost of capital under the retention regime.  
 
The new share issue regime (NSIR) 
Assume next that the dividends are fixed at the minimum level  () ( ) () 1 D fF K K τδ =− − , 
implying  0 D η ≥ , and that the marginal investment is financed with new share issues, i.e. 
0 N >  and  0 N η = . Expression (9) gives  1 D q µ ≡= and from the first order condition with 
respect to the capital stock, expression (11), the cost of capital is derived as
17 
                                                 
14 The corporate costs of capital expressed, among other things, in terms of the personal tax rates and under the 
assumption that δ γ =  are summarized in appendix C, table C.2, for the different tax integration schemes. We 
will not derive or discuss those expressions explicitly in the text, but table C.2 merely works as a simplified 
version to visualize the importance of personal tax rates. 
15 It is common to allow a higher rate of fiscal depreciation than true economic depreciation, i.e. increased 
allowances, even in a classical system. If the fiscal and the economic depreciation rates are equal, the system is 
denoted a pure classical system. 
16 See, for instance, the review papers of Zodrow (1991) and Sinn (1991b). 
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gm f ττ τ θ =+− − .   (16) 
 
Comparing expressions (13) and (15), it is clear that the cost of capital takes the same form 
under the two regimes, but the magnitude may differ depending on the difference between the 
adjusted tax rate 
*












the general model (gm), it is clear that the difference between 
*
gm τ  and τ  captures the tax 
penalty on dividends as compared to capital gains () 1 when 
gm
pdp c θτ τ <> .  
 
By rewriting expression (15) by substituting for 
*
gm τ , 











, and imposing the 
pure classical system assumption γ δ = , the cost of capital becomes 
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 −− − + − 
.   (17) 
 
In comparison to the retention regime, see expression (14), the net corporate cost of capital 
now also depends on the personal tax rate on dividends and the payout ratio.  
 
3 Different methods of mitigating double taxation 
3.1 Introduction 
The most obvious way of mitigating double taxation at the shareholder level is to reduce the 
personal tax rates  pd τ  and  pc τ , and, at the corporate level, to reduce the corporate tax rate τ . 
These changes, or methods, are easily imposed and require no changes in the tax structure as  10
compared to the classical system. Increasing the rate of fiscal depreciation γ , i.e. a deviation 
from the pure classical system, is also simple. Besides these trivial methods, there are several 
more complicated, or genuine, methods. 
 
The imputation system is the most well-known and widely used scheme at the shareholder 
level today. Although the imputation systems differ among countries, the base line is that 
shareholders are allowed to credit a fraction of the tax already paid at the corporate level 
against their personal tax liability. The best-known methods at the corporate level are the split 
rate system and the dividend deduction. The system currently in use in Sweden permits 
corporations to allocate part of their income to a so-called periodization fund, free of tax. 
Other methods that have been used in the past include allocations of before-tax income to a 
so-called tax equalization reserve and the Annell deduction. According to the Annell-rules, 
which have attracted international interest,
18 corporations were permitted a limited deduction 
of dividends on newly issued shares. One alternative suggested in the Swedish debate in the 
1990’s was the reverse imputation system, a method at the corporate level, where the 
intention was to allow the corporation a credit for personal taxes on dividends and capital 
gains paid by the shareholders. 
 
The effects of the trivial methods, i.e. changes in the tax rates in the classical model, on the 
cost of capital are examined in appendix A. The differences among the genuine methods will 
be captured in terms of the adjusted tax rate, denoted 
*
gm τ  above (see expression (16)) and 
*
method τ  in the following. As explained, 
*
method τ  equals the statutory tax rate τ  plus the 
(remaining) tax penalty on dividends as compared to capital gains. This means that the 
expression for the cost of capital we derive will take the same form as in the general model, 
see expressions (13) and (15), but will differ in magnitude due to the differences in the 
adjusted tax rate, 
*
method τ . The costs of capital for all methods are summarized in appendix C, 
while table 1 in section 4 below gives the resulting values for 
*
method τ . 
  
3.2 The imputation system 
An imputation system may be designed in many different ways. However, the implication is 
always a reduced amount of tax paid by shareholders on dividends. Shareholders receive a tax 
                                                 
18 See, for instance, Handbook of Public Economics, vol. 3, (Auerbach and Feldstein  (2002)).  11
credit for part of the tax already paid by the corporation. To model the imputation system we 
will follow Södersten (1977) and introduce a ‘rate of imputation’-parameter, φ , with the 
following interpretation. If φ  equals the corporate tax rate for distributed earnings, τ , the 
shareholder receives full compensation for the amount of tax on distributed income and 
double taxation is eliminated. If φ  is less than τ , shareholders are partially compensated for 
the corporate tax, implying that double taxation is reduced but not eliminated. Hence, with 




 is interpreted as the distributed, before-corporate-tax, 
income, i.e. the imputed shareholder income behind the dividend. The amount of personal tax 





































, where the 
index (is) refers to the imputation system.
20 










is gm τ τ < , since the imputation system reduces the tax penalty on dividends. An 
imputation system therefore reduces the cost of capital in the new share issue regime, cf. 
expression (15) for the classical system. The imputation system has no effect on the cost of 
































21 To be more correct, there exists no specific personal dividend tax rate in an imputation system. In order to fit 
the expressions into the general model, we have chosen to define a “pseudo” personal tax rate on dividends 
defined in the text. These algebraic manipulations do not change the result, but is merely a way of simplifying 
the derivation of the cost of capital, i.e. the same set-up as in the general model can be used.  12




3.3 The split rate system 
The split rate system might be the best-known method at the corporate level. Corporate 
income is taxed at the rate  d τ  if distributed to shareholders, and at the rate τ  if retained in the 
corporation. Since the purpose is to reduce double taxation, distributed income is taxed less 
heavily than retained income, i.e.  d τ τ < . To find a suitable expression for the tax liability T 




 be the distributed income before corporate 







, where π  is the total before-
tax income of the corporation. The tax liability can then be expressed as the sum of taxes on 







T ττ π τ π τ τ
τ ττ

=+ − = − −  −− − 
.     (19) 
 
Using the definition of total taxable income,  () F KC π γ =−, and substituting (19) into the 
budget constraint (3) in the general model, the amount of dividends is given by 
 











 captures the corporate tax discrimination between distributed and retained 
income. The model may then be solved as in the general model, with the budget constraint (3) 
replaced by (20).
23 Since the split rate system affects the tax on distributed income, the cost of 
capital in the retention regime is unaffected. However, the split rate system does affect the 
adjusted tax rate in the new share issue regime. We derive 
                                                 















 (compare with expression (2)). 











,     (21) 
 
where the index (sr) denotes the split rate system. Comparing the adjusted tax rates - 
expression (16) for the general model and expression (21) for the split rate system - we 
conclude that the cost of capital is reduced since 
**
srg m τ τ < , i.e. the tax penalty on dividends 
has decreased. 
 
3.4 Dividend deduction 
Another possibility at the corporate level is to allow the corporations a deduction of a fraction 
β  of the amount of dividends distributed. The taxable income is then given by 
() F KCD π γβ =− − , where  D β  is the dividend deduction, implying that the budget 
constraint (3) becomes 
 
() ( ) ( ) 11 D FK N I C τβ ττ γ −= − + − + .     (22) 
 
Following the set-up as in the general model and given the modified budget constraint in (22), 
we find again that the cost of capital is unaffected in the retention regime.
24 In the new share 





dd f ττ τ θτ β =+− − − ,     (23) 
 
where the index (dd) stands for dividend deduction. Hence, 
**
dd gm τ τ < , implying a reduced cost 
of capital.  
 
3.5 The Annell deduction 
We next turn to the specific methods employed in Sweden during the past decades. The first 
scheme considered, the so-called Annell deduction, is similar to the general dividend 
deduction described above. Since the early 1960’s and until the minor Swedish tax reform of 
                                                 
24 See appendix B for details.  14
1993, Swedish corporations were allowed a deduction of dividends on newly issued shares 
against current profits. A maximum of 10 percent of the value of the new shares could be 
allocated, for a maximum of 20 years. More formally, let a be the rate of deduction and 
assume that the deduction can be taken for ω  years. After ω  years, the entire amount of the 
new share issue in the initial period is deducted, which means that  1 aω = .
25  
 















 Ω= = −  ∫ .     (24) 
 
Hence, the value of a new share issue in the hands of the corporation becomes 
() 1 N NN +Ω = +Ω  and, as a result, the corporate budget constraint (3) now becomes 
 
()( ) 11 D FN I C τ τ γ =− ++ Ω − + .     (25) 
 
From the first order conditions, it follows that the Annell deduction leaves the cost of capital 
unaffected in the retention regime.
26 When the marginal investment is financed with new 
equity, the adjusted tax rate 
*
annell τ  becomes 
 
() ( ) ()
* 11 1
gm




annell gm τ τ < , the dividend tax penalty is reduced and, hence, the cost of capital will 
decrease under the new share issue regime as a result of the Annell deduction. 
 
3.6 Allocation to the tax equalization reserve (SURV) 
The possibility for corporations of allocating before-tax income to the tax equalization 
reserve, hereafter SURV
27, was introduced as part of the Swedish tax reform 1990/91, but 
                                                 
25 If ω  equals 10 years, each year the rate of deduction will be 10 percent of the amount of newly issued shares 
in the initial period. 
26 See appendix B for details. 
27 SURV is the Swedish abbreviation for SkatteUtjämningsreseRV, i.e. tax equalization fund.  15
interrupted after the minor corporate tax reform in 1993. The following way of modelling the 
SURV was proposed by Shahnazarian (1996). Formally, the base for allocation to the SURV 
is the book value of the corporations’ equity capital and the total amount allocated to the 
SURV may not exceed a share ξ  of the base. The parameter ξ  is set to .3, i.e. the maximum 
amount of accumulated SURV allocations is 30 percent of the book equity. In fact, what 
really counts is the change in the book equity, since last year’s allocation must be returned to 
taxation in the current year, unless offset by a new allocation to the SURV. The change in the 
equity capital equals the newly issued equity, plus after-tax income, less dividends. Assuming 
this change in the equity capital to be positive, the net new allocation to the SURV equals 















=+ − −  −+ + 

















=+ − − 
−+ + 
.   (28) 
 
The adjusted tax rate under the new share issue regime turns out to be the same as in the 
general model, i.e. 
*
gm τ , and the effect of the SURV is instead captured by an additional term 
in the parenthesis. Clearly, the costs of capital in both regimes are reduced when the 









 in (27) and (28).
29  
 
If the corporations were allowed to allocate 100 percent of the change in the book capital, i.e. 
1 ξ = , the corporate tax rate would cancel out from (27) and (28), and, hence, leave the cost of 
                                                 
28 See appendix B for details. 
29 In section 4, we will compare the schemes in the new share issue regime when δ γ = , and in that case, an 













30 The meaning of  1 ξ =  is that the corporation’s equity would be untaxed 
as long as it is not reduced. Instead of taxing income as it accrues, it is taxed when distributed, 
which means that a 100-percent SURV is, in fact, equivalent to an expenditure tax.  
 
One of the aims of the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE), proposed by the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies (IFS)
31, is to put equity finance, i.e. retained earnings and new share issue, on a 
similar basis to that of debt finance. To attain this, the corporation would, in principle, be 
allowed to deduct a certain rate of return on the book equity, reflecting the shareholders’ 
required rate of return. The SURV allocation is easily seen as equivalent to the more widely 
known scheme ACE, provided that the change in the equity capital is always positive.  
 
3.7 Allocation to the periodization fund 
The possibility to allocate funds to the SURV was interrupted as a result of the minor 
corporate tax reform in 1993. The periodization fund replaced the SURV. Corporations are 
allowed to defer taxation on 25 percent of each year’s income (after depreciation but before 
corporate tax) for 5 years at most. After 5 years, the corporations must return the fund as 
taxable income. Formally, let α  be the rate of allocation and n the period of deferral. The 
amount returned is included in the base, implying that 
2 α  can be reallocated to the 
periodization fund when α  is returned after m years, 
3 α  reallocated when 
2 α  is returned 
after 2m years, etc. The easiest way of incorporating the periodization fund in the general 
model is then to rewrite the corporate tax rate as an effective rate 
'
t A τ ττ =− , where  t A  
equals the present value of an allocation in period t and, therefore,  t A τ  equals the tax savings 
from the periodization fund. With a discount rate r, the present value becomes
32  
 
                                                 
30 This is the same effect as in the case where a direct depreciation of investment costs is allowed. 
31 The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) is a research institute located in London with a particular focus on the 
UK tax system. See further in Gammie (1991). 
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, a higher value of α  implies a lower cost of capital, a 
conclusion valid for both regimes. 
 
3.8 The reverse imputation system 
The reverse imputation system proposed by Lodin and Södersten (cf. Mutén (1995) and SOU 
(1996)) in the mid 1990’s in Sweden has not been put to work. As the name reveals, the 
reverse imputation system is an imputation system but with a reverse procedure. The 
corporation receives a tax credit when calculating its tax liability, corresponding to the 
amount of tax paid by the shareholders. The corporate tax liability is therefore 
 
() () pd pc TD V N τπ ε τ τ =− + − ! ,       (29) 
 
where  pdD ετ  and  () pc VN ετ − !  constitute the amount of personal tax due on dividends and 
capital gains, respectively. The rate of reverse imputation, ε , takes values between 0 and 1.  
If ε  equals 1, the corporations receive full compensation for the tax paid by the shareholders 
on distributed income (dividends and capital gains) and double taxation is eliminated. The 
total tax rate on corporate income then equals the corporate tax rate. If ε  is less than one, 
                                                 
33 In section 4, we will compare the adjusted rates of the different schemes in the new share issue regime. The 
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 for the periodization fund (see 
table 1).  18
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ris f ττ τ θ =+− − ,     (32) 
 
and the index (ris) refers to the reverse imputation system. Unlike the conventional 
imputation system, which only affects the cost of capital in the new share issue regime, the 
reverse imputation system reduces the cost of capital in both regimes. This is clear since 
ris rr < , 
gmr i s θθ <  and 
**
ris gm τ τ < , which is explained by the fact that corporations are allowed 
to credit both dividends and capital gains taxes.
35 
 
4 Overview of the results and the King-Fullerton effective tax rate 
4.1 Summary of the methods 
The costs of capital, net of the economic depreciation, for the different methods are 
summarized in appendix C, tables C.1 (γ δ = ) and C.2 (γ δ ≠ ). In the following illustrations 
of the results, we will use the pure classical system with γ δ =  as the benchmark. 4 out of the 
                                                 
34 See appendix B for details. 
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8 genuine methods examined, viz. the imputation system, the split rate system, the Annell 
deduction and the dividend deduction, have no effect on the cost of capital in the retention 










,     (33) 
 
which is the same expression as in the classical system.
36 The reverse imputation system, 
allocations to the SURV and the periodization fund do affect the cost of capital in the 
retention regime, see tables C.1 and C.2 in appendix C.  
 
In the new share issue regime, all methods we have considered affect the cost of capital, 












.     (34) 
 
The characteristics of each method are captured in the adjusted tax rate 
*
method τ  when the rates 
of fiscal and economic depreciation coincide. All methods would have the same effect on the 
cost of capital if the adjusted tax rates, summarized in table 1, were equal.
37  
 
                                                 






−  + 
 vanishes since γ δ = . Compare to expression (13). 
37 Note that the trivial methods, i.e. changes in existing tax rates within a pure classical system, all follow from 
the adjusted tax rate for the classical system, 
*
gm τ . We will not report these separately here, even though 
incorporated in the numerical illustrations below.  20
Table 1. The adjusted tax rate 
*
method τ . 
Method  The effective tax rates 
The classical system  () () 11
gm f ττ θ +− −  
The imputation system  () () 11
is f ττ θ +− −  









Dividend deduction  () () 11
gm f ττ θ τ β +− − −  
The Annell deduction  ()( ) () 11 1
gm f ττ θ +− −+ Ω  
The SURV  () () 1
1
1
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 and hence, the adjusted tax 
rate 
*
method τ  equals the statutory corporate tax rate plus any (remaining) tax penalty on dividends (as compared to the taxation 
of capital gains). 
 
From the adjusted tax rates in table 1, it is also straightforward to derive the parameter values 
required for all methods to have the same impact on the cost of capital.  
 
4.2 Numerical illustrations 
The relationships between the genuine and trivial methods of mitigating double taxation may 
be further clarified by using a few numerical examples. Assume that the corporate tax rate 
(τ ) is 35 percent, that the payout ratio ( f ) is 50 percent, and that the economic depreciation 
rate (δ ) and the fiscal depreciation rate (γ ) are both 15 percent. Further, let the real interest 
rate (i) be 5 percent and let the personal tax rate on capital income ( pi τ ) be 30 percent. The 
marginal shareholder faces a dividend tax rate ( pd τ ) of 30 percent and an effective capital 
gains tax rate ( pc τ ) of 15 percent.
38 The numerical illustration focuses on the characteristic 
parameters of each method, summarized in table 2. 
 
                                                 
38 The personal tax rate on capital gains is set to half the personal tax rate on dividends.  21
Table 2. The characteristic parameters. 
Method  Characteristic Parameter (CP)  Initial value (percent) 
Reduced personal tax rate on dividends  pd τ   30 
Reduced personal tax rate on capital gains  pc τ   15 
Reduced corporate tax rate  τ   35 
Increased allowances  γ   15 
The imputation system  φ   0 
The split rate system  d τ   35 
Dividend deduction  β   0 
The Annell deduction  a   0 
The SURV  ξ   0 
The periodization fund  α   0 
The reverse imputation system  ε   0 
Note: When the characteristic parameter equals its initial value, we have a pure classical system. 
 
The new share issue regime 
Assume first that the cost of capital is reduced by a cut in the statutory corporate tax rate from 
its initial value of 35 percent to 25 percent. Column II of table 3 then gives the values for each 
of the characteristic parameters that, ceteris paribus, would be required to accomplish the 
same reduction in the cost of capital. For instance, an increase in the rate of fiscal depreciation 
from 15 percent (see column I) to 26 percent (column II) would have the same impact on the 
cost of capital as a 10-percentage point corporate tax cut. 
 
Table 3. Tax-policy experiments, the new share issue regime (in percent). 
CP  Column I  Column II  Column III  Column IV  Column V  Column VI  Column VII 
 (initial  value)  .25 τ =
 
0 = d τ   0 = pd τ  0 = pc τ  .25 α =
 
0 = τ  
pd τ   30  8 0  - 16  25 . 
pc τ   15 . . . -  10  . 
τ   35  - 23 23 29 33  - 
γ   15  26 32 32 21 17 ∞  
φ   0  24 30 30 18  7  . 
d τ   35 12 -  0 22  31 . 
β   0 76  100  100  50  19 . 
a   0 26  .  . 4 1 . 
ξ   0  36 46 46 25 10  100 
α   0  63 72 72 50  - 100 
ε   0  54 70 70 37 14  .  22
The remaining columns of table 3 present the results of several tax-policy experiments, 
including abolition of the corporate tax on distributed profits (column III) and of the personal 
tax on dividends (column IV). Although being schemes at different levels - the split rate 
system at the firm level and abolishment of dividend taxation at the shareholder level - they 
have the same effect on the cost of capital. 
 
Let us just comment on a couple of further insights from table 3. The cost of capital following 
on the hypothetical scenario of a zero corporate tax rate (see column VII) can only be reached 
by methods based on allocations to the SURV or the periodization fund, or an immediate 
write-off of investment costs. All other methods require higher or lower rates than allowed 
(indicated by a dot). However, today’s rate of allocation to the periodization fund ( .25 α = ) in 
Sweden only requires minor adjustments of the other characteristic parameters (as compared 
to the initial values) to give the same reduction in the cost of capital (column VI). Further, 
abolishing the personal tax rate on capital gains (column V), which is a widely used double 
tax relief, has a low impact on the other characteristic parameters, i.e. has a minor impact on 
the cost of capital.  
 
The retention regime 
Table 4 presents the magnitude for each of the characteristic parameters in the retention 
regime that, ceteris paribus, would be required to accomplish the same reduction in the cost of 
capital as when  0 pc τ =  and  0 τ = .
39  
 
Table 4. Tax-policy experiments, the retention regime (in percent). 
CP  0 pc τ =  0 τ =  
pc τ   - . 
τ   24 - 
γ   29  ∞  
ξ   43 100 
α   69 100 
ε   100 . 
 
                                                 
39 The other tax-policy experiments reported in table 3 have no effect on the cost of capital in the retention 
regime.  23
4.3 The King-Fullerton effective tax rate 
The methodology put forward by King and Fullerton (1984) for calculating effective tax rates 
has become the internationally most well-known approach for comparing tax regimes between 
countries and over time, and it has been used in numerous studies. Following King and 
Fullerton, the pre-tax rate of return on investment is p, and s is the post-tax rate of return on 
savings. The tax wedge is defined as wps =− , and the King-Fullerton (K-F) effective tax 






















.     (35) 
 
This approach offers a simple and highly useful way of comparing the different methods of 
mitigating double taxation, with the K-F effective tax rate for the pure classical system used 
as a benchmark (with the parameter values as in table 2). The lower the K-F effective tax rate, 
the more effective is the method in reducing double taxation.  
 
In table 5, the K-F effective tax rates have been calculated for 3 different values of each 
characteristic parameter and the results are presented both for the retention and the new share 
issue regimes. In the new share issue regime, the K-F effective tax rates have also been 
calculated for different values of the payout ratio.
41 Table 5 contains a great deal of 
information, but we will just comment on how to read the table and emphasize the main 
findings. 
 
                                                 
40 To illustrate the meaning of the K-F effective tax rate, consider the following simplified example. The 
corporation shows a profit before corporate tax of 100 units, all of which is distributed as dividends. Assuming a 
corporate tax rate of 35 percent implies that the post-tax corporate profit is 65 units. Out of the 65 units, 
shareholders receive 45.5 units and pay 19.5 in dividend tax, if the personal dividend tax rate equals 30 percent. 
The K-F effective tax rate on corporate income is then 54.5 percent. This is the K-F effective tax rate for a 
corporation in the pure classical system in the new share issue regime with a payout ratio equal to one. 
41 The payout ratio can be interpreted as the relative importance for the shareholder of receiving dividends. This, 
in turn, may reflect the shareholder’s desire for receiving information (dividends used as a signal) or reducing 
the so-called free cash flow problem.  24
Table 5. The King-Fullerton effective tax rates (in percent). 
Method    Characteristic  The Retention Regime       The New Share Issue Regime     
   Parameter        25 . = f 5 . = f   75 . = f   1 = f  
The benchmark case, 
parameter values as of table 2. 
       44.8    47.2 49.6 52.1  54.5 
Reduced personal tax rate    
pd τ   .2   44.8    45.6  46.4  47.2  48.0 
on dividends       .1    44.8    43.9  43.1  42.3  41.5 
     0    44.8    42.3  39.9  37.4  35.0 
Reduced personal tax rate    
pc τ   .1   41.5    44.8  48.0  51.3  54.5 
on capital gains       .05    38.3    42.3  46.4  50.4  54.5 
     0    35.0    39.9  44.8  49.6  54.5 
Reduced corporate tax rate    τ   .25   36.3    39.1  41.9  44.7  47.5 
     .15    27.8    30.9  34.1  37.3  40.5 
     0    15.0    18.8  22.5  26.3  30.0 
Increased allowances    γ   .3   34.7    37.6  40.5  43.3  46.2 
     .6    26.8    30.0  33.2  36.5  39.7 
     ∞    15.0    18.8  22.5  26.3  30.0 
The imputation system    φ   .15   44.8    45.2  45.6  46.0  46.5 
     .25    44.8    43.4  42.0  40.7  39.3 
     .35    44.8    41.1  37.4  33.7  30.0 
The split rate system    d τ   .25   44.8    45.3  45.9  46.5  47.1 
     .15    44.8    43.9  43.1  42.3  41.5 
     0    44.8    42.4  40.0  37.6  35.2 
Dividend deduction     β   .25   44.8    46.0  47.2  48.4  49.7 
     .5    44.8    44.8  44.8  44.8  44.8 
     1    44.8    42.4  40.0  37.6  35.2 
The Annell deduction    a   .1   44.8    43.9  43.1  42.3  41.4 
     .2    44.8    43.6  42.4  41.3  40.1 
     .3    44.8    43.5  42.2  40.9  39.6 
The SURV     ξ   .15   41.7    44.3  46.8  49.4  52.0 
     .5    33.0    36.0  38.9  41.9  44.8 
     1    15.0    18.8  22.5  26.3  30.0 
The periodization fund    α   .25   42.8    45.3  47.8  50.3  52.9 
     .5    39.5    42.2  44.8  47.5  50.2 
     1    15.0    18.8  22.5  26.3  30.0 
The reverse imputation    ε   .25   42.9    44.5  46.4  48.3  50.2 
system       .5    40.7    41.6  42.9  44.2  45.5 




The new share issue regime 
Common for all methods, except for the Annell deduction, is that the K-F effective tax rate 
increases with the payout ratio (for moderate changes in initial values of the characteristic 
parameters).
42 It follows from a higher payout ratio that a larger fraction of capital is 
distributed as dividends, which is taxed at the higher personal tax rate on dividends (as 
compared to capital gains). Methods based on a reduced tax rate on distributed income would 
be expected to perform relatively better with a higher payout ratio. This is confirmed in the 
calculations and is best illustrated by comparing the schemes based on reduced  pd τ  and 
reduced  pc τ  for the hypothetical case where  0 pd pc ττ == .  
 
The retention regime 
There are five methods with the same K-F effective tax rate as in the benchmark case, 
independent of the value of the characteristic parameter, viz. a reduced  pd τ , the imputation 
system, the split rate system, the dividend deduction and the Annell deduction. Accordingly, 
these methods do not reduce the K-F effective tax rate under the retention regime and, hence, 
corporate income is taxed twice.
43  
 
5 Summary of the results and other perspectives on tax integration 
A large number of schemes for reducing double taxation have been modeled in a simple cost 
of capital framework. Both internationally well-known methods and more specific methods 
used in Sweden have been compared. Some of the methods are labeled as trivial, implying 
only reduced tax rates or increased allowances, while the genuine schemes require more 
extensive changes in the tax structure.  
 
The main conclusion is that all methods manage to mitigate double taxation to some extent 
when the marginal investment is financed with new equity. However, when the marginal 
investment is financed with retained earnings, two of the most well-known and most utilized 
                                                 
42 For the Annell deduction, the K-F effective tax rate falls with a higher payout ratio for all values of the 
characteristic parameter. When the corporation increases its dividends, the stock of newly issued equity will 
increase since a larger amount of new equity is required for additional investments. This, in turn, will increase 
the amount of Annell deduction.  
43 Naturally, this is the same conclusion as in the analytical derivations of the adjusted tax rate in section 3.  26
methods, the imputation system at the shareholder level and the split rate system at the 
corporate level, leave the cost of capital unaffected. The same is true both for a dividend 
deduction at the corporate level and a reduced dividend tax rate at the shareholder level. 
Abolishment of the personal tax rate on capital gains, which is a widely used method that 
reduces double taxation in both regimes, still implies a high King-Fullerton effective tax rate 
on distributed income, i.e. the method has a minor effect on double taxation of corporate 
income. Besides showing the importance of the source of finance, this paper also illustrates 
how the dividend payout ratio, which differs considerably among firms, affects the cost of 
capital. The higher is the payout ratio the higher is the cost of capital.  
 
From the perspective of reducing the cost of capital many of the schemes examined are 
equivalent. An interesting question is then whether there are other considerations that may 
cause the governments to choose a particular tax integration scheme. We will tentatively 
discuss this question below, drawing on the analysis of this paper. 
 
Employing a tax integration scheme creates a cost for the government in terms of forgone tax 
revenue. The obvious goal for the government would seem to be to reduce the cost of capital 
as much as possible, given some level of forgone tax revenue. As is clear from the analysis, 
the source of finance at the margin is a matter of decisive importance for the outcome of a 
particular method. However, the precise design of the methods matters too. The Annell 
deduction, the imputation system, the split rate system and dividend deduction all have in 
common that they reduce the cost of capital in the new share issue regime only. If a reduced 
cost of new equity is also the policy objective the Annell deduction should be the first choice. 
The reason for this is that the Annell deduction offers a tax rate reduction to dividends on 
newly issued shares, not to all dividends. For a given forgone tax revenue, it is, hence, more 
effective to introduce an Annell deduction than, for instance, an imputation system.  
 
On the other hand, if the aim is to reduce the cost of capital in both regimes, i.e. to both 
mature (assumed to make use of retained earnings) and newly started (assumed to make use of 
new equity) corporations, a variety of methods are available, e.g. a reduction in the corporate 
income tax rate, increased allowances, allocation to periodization funds and allocation to tax 
equalization reserves. 
    27
The varying approaches to corporate tax integration in Sweden during the 1990’s may be seen 
as a result of how political ideologies affect technical solutions in the tax structure.
44 At the 
beginning of the 1990’s Sweden had a Social Democratic government. The methods 
employed up to that date were all at the corporate level. During the non-socialist government, 
1991-94, the personal dividend tax was reduced and eventually eliminated in 1994. The stated 
motive was to stimulate households to invest in shares and increase the private ownership of 
corporations, which may be seen as an ideological objective of a non-socialist government.
45 
The double tax relief shifted from corporations to shareholders with small or even negative 
impact, i.e. a higher cost, on the cost of capital according to Bergström and Södersten (1994). 
After the election in the fall of 1994, the new the Social Democratic government restored its 
previous policy and reintroduced a tax relief at the corporate level (the periodization fund).  
 
One reason for choosing an imputation system at the shareholder level is the desire to 
maintain a comprehensive income tax where corporate income will be taxed at the 
shareholders’ marginal tax rate. The marginal tax rate will then depend on the shareholder’s 
identity, reflecting the degree of progressiveness in the income tax system. Two of the Nordic 
countries, Finland and Norway, switched to an imputation system at the beginning of the 
1990’s.
46  This was part of the major tax reforms taking place in the Nordic countries when 
the so-called dual income tax system was introduced. Under the Nordic dual income tax, 
capital income is taxed at a proportional rate lower than the top marginal tax rate on labor 
income. Introducing an imputation system into the dual income tax structure seems strange, 
where the policy objective is no longer to tax corporate income at progressive income tax 
rates. However, the governments in Finland and Denmark stressed the importance of 
international harmonization and suggested pedagogical reasons for using the more 
complicated imputation system instead of the simpler method of reducing the proportional 
personal tax rate on dividends. 
 
                                                 
44 Similar political aspects can most likely also be found in other countries. 
45 The reduced personal tax rate is only one example. Another example that strengthens the assertion of 
ideological differences would be the advantageous rules for very small corporations that the right-wing 
government in 1991-94 also introduced, see further in Bergström and Södersten (1994). 
46 Both countries used methods at the corporate level based on deduction related to dividends before the tax 
reforms at the beginning of the 1990’s.  28
A characteristic feature of the corporate tax system in the Nordic countries before the tax 
reforms was the combination of high nominal corporate tax rates and extensive opportunities 
for consolidation in terms of tax-free fund allocations and accelerated depreciation. This 
system was an effective tool also for carrying losses backward, since the consolidated capital 
could be offset against current losses. As a result, new consolidation capacity for coming 
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Appendix A: The trivial methods 
In this appendix we will discuss how changes in an existing tax rate and accelerated 
depreciation within the pure classical system, i.e. the trivial methods, affect the cost of capital. 
 
A.1 Reduced personal tax rates on dividends and capital gains 
Since corporate income is taxed both at the corporate and the personal level, one obvious 
possibility of mitigating double taxation is to reduce or eliminate one of the existing tax 
rates.
47 As is clear from (14), the personal tax rate on dividends,  pd τ , does not affect the cost 
of capital in the retention regime. A change in the personal tax rate on dividends is instead 
capitalized into the market value of the corporation. The market value, as expressed in (2), 









= ∫ . The capitalization effect is then obvious, since 
1
gm θ < , and r  is independent of  pd τ .
48  
 
The personal tax rate on both dividends and capital gains affect the cost of capital in the new 
share issue regime.
49 A reduction in the personal tax rate on dividends and/or capital gains 
reduces the cost of capital, as is clear from (17). The magnitude of the reduction depends on 
the corporation’s payout ratio f. If the payout ratio is small, close to zero, changes in  pc τ  will 
have significant effects on the cost of capital. This case is similar to the retention regime, with 
the important difference in the amount of distributed income. The corporation pays dividends 
in excess of the payout ratio according to the retention regime. If f is close to zero in the new 
share issue regime, the corporation distributes a small amount of dividends and, therefore, 
shareholders pay a dividend tax near zero. Hence, the dividend tax rate has a very limited 
effect on the cost of capital. The other extreme is when the payout ratio is high, i.e. f is close 
                                                 
47 A reduced tax rate on capital income,  pi τ , increases the corporate cost of capital. Remember that  pi τ  is used 
only as the tax rate on interest income and, since a separate tax parameter for dividends is introduced, we will 
not discuss  pi τ  further. 
48 Note from the general model that  1
gm q θ =< in equilibrium in this regime, as long as the effective tax rate on 
dividends is higher than that on capital gains.  
49 In this regime,  1
gm q θ == in steady state, reflecting that new investments must bear the personal dividend 
tax.  32
to unity. A reduction in the dividend tax rate is then an appropriate method for reducing the 
cost of capital, since most of the income is distributed as dividends.  
 
As an extreme case, the personal tax rate on dividends and capital gains may be reduced to 
zero, i.e.  0 = = pc pd τ τ . In the retention regime, this implies a reduced cost of capital and a 
considerable windfall gain for the shareholders. The cost of capital is reduced even further in 
the new share issue regime since both rates affect the cost of capital. In fact, in the pure 












.     (A1) 
 
A.2 Reduced corporate tax rate 
The effect on the cost of capital of a change in the corporate tax rate is the most 
straightforward method to analyze. Even though the magnitude of the reduction differs 
between the two regimes, the cost of capital decreases in both. The cost of capital in the 
retention regime simplifies to  
 
RR
K F r δ =+     ,     (A2) 
 












.       (A3)  
 
Accelerated depreciation, i.e. the difference between δ  and γ , does not affect the cost of 
capital when the corporate tax rate is equal to zero.  
 
A.3 Increased allowances 
Accelerated depreciation allows the corporation to defer tax payments, which is tantamount to 
obtaining an interest-free loan from the government. This interest-free loan reduces the cost of 
the marginal investment. Hence, one possible method for reducing double taxation is to allow 
the corporation larger allowances (including e.g. an investment tax credit). Increased  33
allowances will be modeled by letting the maximum fiscal depreciation rate rise in the general 
model. The impact of allowances on the cost of capital is best illustrated if considering three 
different cases: the pure classical system where no accelerated depreciation is allowed, 
accelerated depreciation as in the general model or an immediate write-off of investment 
costs.  
 
In the pure classical system where the fiscal depreciation rate, γ , equals the true economic 







 in expressions (13) and (15) vanishes. This means that 
the share of the marginal investment financed by deferred tax payments equals zero and, 
hence, that the marginal investment is solely financed with corporate equity. The cost of 





























.   (A5) 
 
The cost of capital has increased in both regimes, as compared to the general model, see 
expressions (13) and (15). Note that the cost is greater under the new share issue regime, as 
compared to the retention regime, as was also the case under the classical system, but the 
difference has increased.  
 
The case where the corporation is allowed to directly write off the investment costs is 
calculated as  () () lim  KK F KF K
γ →∞ = , which implies that the cost of capital becomes 
 
RR
K F r δ =+       ( A 6 )  














.     (A7) 
 
The costs have fallen as compared to the pure classical system, since the possibility to defer 
tax payment reduces the fraction of equity finance at the margin. The cost of capital is 
unaffected by the corporate tax when investment costs are written off directly. Furthermore, 
note that the difference in the cost of capital between the two regimes has been reduced. In 
summary, the cost falls faster in the new share issue regime as γ  becomes larger, since a 
greater share of new investments is financed with the interest-free loan from the government. 
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Appendix B: Calculations 
Some of the calculations and derivations are presented in this appendix, but the focus is on 
presenting the first order conditions from the optimization procedure. A comprehensive 
derivation of the general model is given in B.1, from which many of the other methods follow 
straightforward, simply by redefinitions of relevant parameters. 
  
B.1 The general model 
Constraints: 
() ( ) 1 D FK N I C τ τ γ =− +− +      (3) 
() ( ) () 1 D fF K K τδ ≥− −    (4) 
0 N ≥       (5) 
CI C γ =− !       (6) 
K IK δ =− !       (7) 
 
The problem to maximize: 
Max  () ()
() 0
0
,, , , , , , ;
rt t
tt





! ! , where 
() ( ) ( )






DN F K CNID
D fF K K N I C CI K K
θµ τ τ γ
ητ δ η µ γ µ δ
Λ⋅= − + − + + − −  




The first order conditions: 
I : 0 DKC µµµ −++=      (8) 
N :   1 0 DN µη −+ + =      (9) 
D: 0
gm
DD θµ η −+=      (10) 
K :  () ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 0 DD K K D K fFr f µη τ µ δ η τ δ µ −− − + + − + = !    (11) 
C:  () 0 DC C r µτ γ µ γ µ −+ + = !      (12) 
 
The assumption of a steady state solution implies that  0 KC µµ == !! , which is used in all 
coming derivations.  
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The retention regime (RR)  
0 N η >  and  0 D η = , which gives following first order conditions: 















=−=  + 
 
  K’: 
()
()

















=  − 

++ − +  =  −+ 
 
 











 in K’, which gives the following: 
 







































=+ −  −+ 
 .      (13) 
 
The new share issue regime (NSIR) 















=−=  + 
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() ( ) ( ) ( )























µδ η τ δ
µη τ
γτ γ
µδ η τ δ
γ
τµ η
µγ τ γ δητγ δ
τµ η γ
+− − 
=  −− 
  +−  +− −  +   = 
−− 






Add δ  and subtract  () ( ) ( )












 in K’, which gives the following: 
() ( ) ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( )
() () ( )
() ( ) ( )
() ( ) ( )
()



































µγ τ γδ η τγ δ
τµ η γ δ
δ
τµ η γ
µγδδ τγ δ γ τ γ ητ γ δ
µγ δτ γ δ δτ δ η τγ δ
δ
τµ η γ
µγ τ γ τ δ
δ
τµ η γ
µγ τ γ δ
δ
µτ γ
+− + − − + −  

−− +   =+
−− +
  +− ++− − − +  
 



































Since  1 D µ =  in the general model under the new share issue regime, see expression (9),  D η  is 
given by  1
gmg m
DD ηµ θθ =− = −  from (10), which gives the cost of capital as 
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=+ −  −+ 







gm f ττ τ θ =+− − .   (16) 
 
B.2 The split rate system 
Given the tax liability in (19), the budget constraint is 
 













The lambda function in the optimization problem becomes: 
() ( ) ( ) ( )





Dd N C K
DN F K CNI D
D fF K K N I C C I K K
θµ τϕ τ γ
ητ δ η µ γ µ δ
Λ⋅= − + − + + − −  




The first order conditions in steady state, i.e.  0 KC µµ == !! , become: 
I : 0 DK C µϕ µ µ −+ + =  
N :   1 0 DN µϕ η −+ + =  
D: 0
gm
DD θµ η −+=  
K :  ( ) () () () 11 0 DD d K K D d fF r f µη τ µ δ η τ δ −− − + + − =  
C:  () 0 DC r µϕ τ γ µ γ−+ = 
Using the same line of actions as in B.1 gives the cost of capital as reported in table C.1 in 
appendix C. 
 
B3 Dividend deduction 
Plugging the tax function  () () TF K C D τγ β =− − into the corporation’s cash flow, i.e. 
() () () D FK N I FK C D τγ β =+ − − − − , gives the budget constraint as in the main text  39
 
() ( ) ( ) 11 D FK N I C τβ ττ γ −= − + − + .     (22) 
 
The lambda function in the optimization problem becomes: 
() ( ) ( ) ( )






DN F K CNI D
D fF K K N I C CI K K
θµ τ τ γ τ β
ητ δ η µ γ µ δ
Λ⋅= − + − + + − − −  




The first order conditions in steady state, i.e.  0 KC µµ == !! , become: 
I : 0 DKC µµµ −++=  
N :   1 0 DN µη −+ + =   
D:  () 10
gm
DD θµ τ β η −− + =  
K :  ( ) () ( ) () 11 0 DD K K D fFr f µη τ µ δ η τ δ −− − + + − =  
C:  () 0 DC r µτ γ µ γ −+ = 
Using the same line of actions as in B.1 gives the cost of capital as reported in table C.1 in 
appendix C. 
 
B.4 The Annell deduction 






ω τ −  Ω= − ,     (24) 
 
as in the main text, which implies the following budget constraint 
 
() ( ) ( ) 11 D FK N I C τ τ γ =− ++ Ω − + .     (25) 
 
The lambda function in the optimization problem becomes: 
() ( ) ( ) ( )






DN F K NI CD
D fF K K N I C CI K K
θµ τ τ γ
ητ δ η µ γ µ δ
Λ⋅= − + − + + Ω − + −  




The first order conditions in steady state, i.e.  0 KC µµ == !! , become:  40
I : 0 DKC µµµ −++=  
N :   () 11 0 DN µη −+ + Ω+ =   
D: 0
gm
DD θµ η −+=  
K :  ( ) () ( ) () 11 0 DD K K D fFr f µη τ µ δ η τ δ −− − + + − =  
C:  () 0 DC r µτ γ µ γ −+ = 
Using the same line of actions as in B.1 gives the cost of capital as reported in table C.1 in 
appendix C. 
 
B.5 Allocation to the tax equalization reserve (SURV) 
Plugging the tax function  () () TF K C C τγ ξ =− − !  into the corporation’s cash flow constraint 
() D FK N I T τ =+ − −  gives the following budget constraint (not reported in the main text) 
 
() ( ) 1 D FK C N I C τ τ γ τ ξ =− + +− + ! .     (B1) 
 
The lambda function in the optimization problem becomes: 
() ( ) ( )






DN F K CNI CD
D fF K K N I C CI K K
θµ τ τ γ τ ξ
ητ δ η µ γ µ δ
 Λ⋅= − + − + + − + − 





The first order conditions in steady state, i.e.  0 KC µµ == !! , become: 
I : 0 DKC µµµ −++=  
N :   1 0 DN µη −+ + =   
D: 0
gm
DD θµ η −+=  
K :  ( ) () ( ) () 11 0 DD K K D fFr f µη τ µ δ η τ δ −− − + + − =  
C:  () ( ) 0 DC rr µτγ ξ µ γ +− + =  
Using the same line of actions as in B.1 gives the cost of capital as in table C.1 in appendix C. 
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B.6 The reverse imputation system 
In the main text, we derived the tax liability as 
 
() () () () pd pc TF K C D V N τγ ε τ τ =− − − − ! ,   (29) 
 
which implies that the corporation’s budget constraint becomes (not reported in the main text) 
 












! .   (B2) 
 
Since dividends in (B2) depend on the change in the firm’s market value, we have to 
substitute for D in the non-arbitrage condition (1), i.e. 
 







FK N I C




 −+ − +
−= − + − + − − 
−−  
!! .  (B3) 
 
























−= − − + − + +     −−


























−= −  −+ − +  +      −−






















 −−  −
−−     −  
     (B4) 



















 −−  −
−−     −  
,    (B5) 
 
which means that the non-arbitrage condition in the reverse imputation system equals 
 
() ( ) 1
ris ris Vr V F K NI C N θτ τ γ −= − − + − + +  
! .   (B6) 
 
Solving the difference equation in (B6), we obtain the corporate market value as 
 




ris rt t ris
tt




 =− + − + −  ∫ . (B7) 
 
The optimization problem becomes: 











! ! , where 
  
() ( ) ( )






FK C N I N N I C C
I K K FK C N I f FK K
θτ τ γ η µ γ
µδ ητ τ γ τ δ
 Ψ⋅= − + + − − + + − − +   





The first order conditions are: 
I : 0
ris
DKC θηµµ −−++=  
N :   1 0
ris
DN θη η −+ + =   
K :  () () () () 11 0
ris ris
DD K K D fF r f θη η τ µ δ η τ δ +− − − + + − =  
C:  () 0
ris ris
DC r θτ γ η τ γ µ γ +− + =  
 
The solution for the two regimes follows the solution in the general model in B.1, with the 
difference in the new definitions of 
ris rr =  and 
ris θθ =  according to (B4) and (B5).    
 
Appendix C: Tables 
Table C.1. The corporate cost of capital expressed in terms of r  and θ . 
Method (characteristic parameter)  The retention regime  The new share issue regime  Remark 
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Table C.2. The corporate cost of capital expressed in terms of the tax rates, δ γ =  for simplicity. 
Method (characteristic parameter)  The retention regime  The new share issue regime  Remark 
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ττ τ τ γ
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2
111 1
11 1 1 1 1
pi pi pc
pc pd pi pc
i
ff i
τξ τ τ τ γ ξ τ δ
τ ττ τ τ γ
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